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Abstract 
 
 
Terrorism is not a natural hazard outside the range of corporate decision-making. Simple 
micro-economic analysis shows how globalisation changed the supply of terrorist attacks 
and the costs for tolerating terrorist hazard. Approaches developed in organizational 
strategy help to single out three strategic decisions directly affecting the vulnerability of 
firms in a globalised world: exposure, geographical spread, and organisational form. The 
analysis suggests that the gains from ubiquity, leanness in production, and long-term 
commitment need to be adjusted for the terrorist hazard involved. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Terrorism affects firms: their physical assets, the lives of their employees, their 
knowledge base and their reputation. Terrorism did not start with the attack on the World 
Trade Centre in New York 2001, neither is terrorism limited to spectacular acts (Schelling, 
1991). There is a banal version of terrorism with a long historical record for attacking 
special social groups, government organisations, public utilities, and, indeed, firms (Table 
1).  
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Table 1  Terrorism after WWII 
 
Period Example Context Legitimation Targets Appeal to general public 
1945-19681 Indochina,  
India, Pakistan, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, 
Algeria 
Attempt to rebuild the 
pre-WWII colonial 
empires 
“Theory-based”; 
Marxism, Nationalism 
Building of guerrilla strongholds 
from which to expand control over 
territories; destruction of colonial 
political and economic infrastructure 
Appealing to “universal” values; 
using media for mobilising 
sympathy for a just cause; media 
divided in sympathizers and 
opponents 
1968- 19722 Indochina, 
Bolivia, 
Palestine 
Africa 
Nation-building; 
Correction of colonial 
legacy; civil war based 
terrorism 
Self-determination; 
Neo-Marxism 
Control over territories; destruction 
of political and economic 
infrastructure of incumbent regimes 
See above 
1972-mid 80s3 France, Austria (Vienna, 
OPEC) 
Italy, Germany (Munich, 
Olympics), Palestine,  
USA (Hearst) 
Wider economic 
integration; Oil Crisis; 
radicalisation of 
segments of the civic 
rights movement 
End of classical 
theory-based terrorism; 
diffused anti-capitalism 
critique 
Destruction of capitalist institutions: 
multinationals, cartels, attacks and 
kidnapping as a means to re-finance 
terrorist activities, extortion 
End of seeking universal 
sympathy; use of media for making 
the cause or the terrorist group 
“known” 
Mid-80s-2000 (1) Egypt, Middle-East; 
Iran, Iraq, 
UK (S. Rushdie), 
Taliban 
Re-newed religious 
fundamentalism 
Fight against the 
heretics 
Destruction of places of worshipping 
and economic infrastructure of the 
heretics 
Media used for mobilising the 
support of the believers; media 
used for making group activities 
known 
 (2) UK (radical animal 
rights activists 
Japan (subway) 
Pseudo-religious groups See above See above See above 
 (3) Latin-America, 
Africa; after 1989: 
Central/East Europe 
Central Asia 
Weakening of economic 
border controls; 
collapse socialism, 
weak states 
No legitimation offered; 
commercialisation of 
terrorism “Banditry” 
Destruction of physical assets and 
human capital of international firms 
and competing producers/traders 
Using the media for logistic 
purposes and getting attention 
2000 -  Taliban, Columbia, 
Thai/Philippine 
connection 
Globalisation Merging of (1) and (2); 
diffuse justifications 
Destruction of economic resources 
without acknowledging the 
background of owners 
See above 
                                                   
1 With the war in Algeria ends the first period of decolonisation 
2 The end of this period is defined by the death of Che Guevara and the beginning of the war in Vietnam as a war North- against South-Vietnam 
3 The end of this period is defined by the hostage taking in the embassy of Iran in London by “fundamentalists” indicating a new religious 
fundamentalism and the end  
  of the belief that social and economic reforms will find a broad worldwide consensus. 
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 Yet, to the best of our knowledge there is no literature that pays attention to the fact that 
protecting a firm’s resource base against terrorism is as crucial a management task as 
increasing its asset’s value. Leading management journals have produced only a handful 
of articles on terrorism1. This suggests that terrorism is seen as a political problem whose 
analysis is left to highly specialised journals such as Terrorism and Political Violence, 
Defence Economics, Journal of Conflict Resolution, or Terrorism. Only recently has 
terrorism attracted the attention of political economists (Frey and Luechinger, 2003)2 or 
journals such as the Harvard Business Review. While this literature focuses on certain 
features of terrorism, as for example Selten’s model of Kidnapping (Selten, 1988), or 
studies of terrorism and tourism (Pizam and Smith, 2000; Drakos and Kutan, 2001), 
terrorism and trade (Walkenhorst and Dihel, 2002; Ender and Sanders, 2000; Nitsch and 
Schumacher, 2002), or terrorism and growth (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003), research 
on how firms can meet the challenge terrorism poses is rarely addressed (an exception is 
Harvey, 1992).  
 
To claim that ideologies such as religious fundamentalism are the driving force behind 
the present wave of terrorism misses the point (Laqueur, 1977). Acts of terrorism can be 
found in all (conventional) wars, wars of independence, and civil wars and will be 
legitimised by any ideology. What has changed however in the recent past is the 
worldwide attention terrorism can attract, the worldwide operation of terrorists, and the 
worldwide exposure of firms to such a threat (Enders and Sanders, 2000; Enders and 
Sanders, 1996). In short, it can be claimed that globalisation has changed the rules of the 
game for both terrorists and firms.  
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The following attempts to fill the gap in the literature by first, offering a simple model on 
terrorism as seen from the firms’ perspective, and second, by showing how globalisation 
affects the scale and effectivity of terrorist attacks, as well as companies ability to cope 
with terrorists hazard. It will be shown that firms need to analyse terrorist hazard in a 
globalised world, and what deterrence strategies are available that allow preventing or 
limiting such a terrorist hazard. 
 
Terrorism in general terms refers to the intentional destruction of resources, in particular 
physical assets, and knowledge assets, i.e. the lives and knowledge of one individual or 
one group of people. In the eighties already attacks against business or other private 
interests added up to three quarters of all “anti-US-American” terrorists attacks (Kovsky, 
1990). The prime target is not usually a person, in which case one would talk about a 
political murder, or a state, in which case one would talk about a civil war, but 
organization such as for example firms. The overall effect of terrorism is the reduction of 
the total capital stock of a society. Another consequence is the loss in worldwide trade. 
Thus for example based on data from 200 countries over the period 1960 – 1993 one 
study showed that “a doubling in the number of terrorist incidents (a rise by 100 percent) 
is associated with a decrease in bilateral trade by about 6 per cent” (Nitsch and 
Schumacher, 2002: 5) even if adjusted for alternative causes of violence such as political 
instability or military conflict.  
 
Terrorism though widespread is not found in all countries, neither is terrorism a stable 
feature in the business world. Not all firms face the same risk in form of being singled out 
as targets for terrorist attacks, and not all firms occupy the highest position in the ranking 
of “worthwhile” targets all the time. For this reason alone terrorism must not be 
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“accepted” as a form of natural hazard to which firms cannot but passively react. As will 
be shown in what follows, there is a subtle but crucial interaction between management 
strategies and a terrorist groups’ decision what, whom, how, and how often to attack. 
Only by analysing the interaction between firms operating in international markets and 
the rationale of terrorist groups, strategic variables can be singled out that help the 
management to systematically respond, if not anticipate terrorist hazard.  
 
Globalisation affects both terrorism and peaceful trade. This is so because technical 
innovation and the expansion of markets know no morality. There is no discrimination 
between “good” and “bad” products, “good” and “bad” production techniques, or “good” 
and “bad” forms of investment. Subsequently, the benefits globalisation offers are not 
limited to private production and trade. Instead the production, trade and information 
sharing within and amongst terrorist groups has also profited from the IT-revolution, 
trade liberalisation and the changes in the international market for news. As will be 
shown in what follows there is, however, an asymmetric effect of globalisation. While 
terrorists benefited from globalisation in form of higher effectivity, i.e. damage per 
attack, firms face higher risks and rapidly increasing deterrence costs. Only the 
systematic analysis of the interaction between firm’s international investment (strategies) 
and terrorist activities allows clarifying the vulnerability of a firm, and assessing the 
trade-offs between usual (competition driven) and deterrence strategies. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. It starts with the introduction of a simple model 
introducing the interaction between terrorist destruction and firms protection of assets 
(sec.2). It will be shown that there is a “market” for terrorism where the supply of 
terrorism determined by number of attacks and effectivity per attack meets not “demand” 
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in its conventional sense but toleration of an insecure environment, defined by the firms 
willingness to invest or maintain operations in locations with a high risk of terrorist 
hazard. To which extent globalisation changed the behaviour of both terrorists as 
suppliers and tolerating firms will be analysed in sec. 3. The paper ends with a discussion 
of the trade-offs between strategies that allow exploiting the chances offered by 
globalisation and the need to cope with terrorist hazard.  
 
2. The interaction between terrorism and firms  
 
2.1 The supply of terrorism 
 
Using the market analogy it can be assumed that terrorist groups produce a specific good, 
terrorist activities whose frequency depends on the “risk adjusted” expected effectivity. 
Terrorist attacks do not aim at maximum damage measured by total value of resources 
(and lives) destroyed. Instead we observe two factors playing a crucial role for 
identifying targets for attack, disruption of economic life of a country or an organisation 
of a firm, and attention by a worldwide audience a terrorist group can expect. In the case 
of an economy the direct damage is not limited to the replacement costs of the destroyed 
assets but includes the costs in form of “production and exchange foregone” for the time 
the normal economic life of a country comes to a standstill. It is for this reason that 
infrastructure such as railway tracks or airports, but also oil pipelines are high on the list 
of attractive targets. The total damage however, needs to include also changes in 
production and consumption patterns, more regulation leading to higher transaction costs 
in trade, and higher costs for security.  
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Likewise, terrorist attacks, or sabotage in firms do not aim necessarily on maximum 
damage. To destroy the production site of one crucial component in a value chain of a 
company promises higher damage in terms of disrupting the production process. To harm 
oil companies one does not need to destroy, mostly heavily protected, oilfields, to attack 
pipelines is enough3. As in the case of a country the damage is not limited to the material 
costs (for a stretch of pipeline) but includes the loss in production, the need to build up 
inventories of all firms relying on the input, higher insurance and more safety devices. 
 
The disruption of economic processes is not the only aim of terrorist attacks. As table 1 
shows to attract the attention of the world press is another factor that defines the 
attractiveness of targets. The spectacularity of an attack ensures world wide press 
coverage which in turn makes the group internationally known and offers the feeling of 
aggrandisement or revenge most terrorist leaders seem to be motivated by. The literature 
speaks about high impact incidents (Wilkinson, 2000) whenever the target are persons 
such as religious leaders or buildings, for example the Tamil library in Sri Lanka or 
Angkhor Wat in Cambodia, that are regarded as unique. Another target are persons and 
buildings that symbolize a certain ideology, life style or centre of power of a state, a 
religious organization or a firm. The murder of major politicians, such as Kennedy in the 
U.S., Palme in Sweden, Rabin in Israel, Moro in Italy fall in this category, as does the 
attack on the WTC in New York and the attack on the Indian parliament in 2001. A bomb 
thrown into the local branch of the Deutsche Bank in Germany killing several people 
barely attracts the attention the murder of the CEO of the same bank (Alfred Herrhausen) 
got. In all these cases the predictable reaction was the awareness of vulnerability, if not 
the wish to retaliate. This reaction, in turn, will lead to increased spending for arms and 
safety equipment, a redirection of trade, less mobility and the re-establishment of national 
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borders, ultimately harming world trade (Frey, 1988). 
 
In short, terrorist attacks cause an economic damage at a country level and in worldwide 
trade, and an operational damage at the level of a firm, the latter of which is at the core of 
what follows. Though very hard to measure the following data exclusively concentrating 
on the effect of the Sept. 11th, show the dimension of the problem (Joint Economic 
Committee, 2002): It is estimated that the increased expenses for homeland security and 
the accompanying new regulations led to an increase in transaction costs for US-export 
and import that add up to 1 to 3 per cent of the value of these traded goods (Hobijn, 2002). 
Another study shows that in the US firms increased their inventories by 10 per cent, and 
pay 20 per cent more in commercial insurance after September 11th (UBS Warburg, 2001). 
Higher costs for protecting assets translate into a reduction in productivity, a 1.12 per cent 
decline in labour productivity, and a 0.63 per cent decline in total factor productivity 
which in absolute terms adds up to seventy billion US-$ after Sept 11th (Hobijn, 2002). 
 
In general terms an economic analysis claims that with increasing net damage (damage 
plus attention minus costs) the frequency of attacks increases not unlike the product 
markets where increasing product prices set positive incentives to increase production 
(see Figure 1). What is claimed here however is that globalisation, understood as the 
IT-revolution and internationalisation in world trade, lead to higher net gains per attack 
which results in a shift to the left of the supply curve for terrorism. Before this 
development will be discussed the determinants of a firm’s willingness to tolerate 
terrorist hazard need to be introduced. 
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2.2. The toleration of terrorist attacks 
 
There is of course no positive demand for terrorism by private industry, or any other 
organisation. The demand function (see Figure 1) is rather the derivative of the 
calculation to end operation and investment or remain in one location despite terrorists 
hazard. Firms do not immediately leave or avoid a special location when they learn about 
terrorism. Managers know or assume that not all firms will be attacked at the same time 
and that different firms or sectors face different degrees of vulnerability. Not all firms or 
industries are singled out as a target. Terrorist hazard is not “equally distributed” across 
countries or sectors. The demand curve therefore is better described as the toleration 
function of firms (or other organisations) with respect to terrorist hazard. It is claimed 
here that the hazard concentrates on firms and industries that can be described by three 
specific features:. 
 
1. Exposure generates vulnerability. Exposure reflects first size, reputation, 
dominance, or strategic importance of firms and/or their products. The better 
known a company or its products the higher is the risk to get singled out as a 
target. Exposure reflects second the symbolic value of firms and industries when 
for example they are regarded as successors of the (old) colonial power (ING in 
Indonesia), the representative of a lifestyle (Mac Donalds), unbridled capitalism 
(pharmaceutical industry with its genetic products and animal testing), or too 
close a partner of a rejected political regime (De Beers in Apartheid South 
Africa). To aim at obscurity would be a remedy; to hide behind relatively 
unknown (brand) names, or to keep a low profile by using local joint venture 
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partners is another way to escape high exposure, yet works to the detriment of 
international marketing.  
 
2. Geographical spread of firms generates vulnerability. In the globalised world 
terrorists do no longer have to travel to firm’s home base, attacking a subsidiary is 
enough. For attacking a much frowned upon market such as the financial or oil 
market one does no longer have to travel to New York or London, or to attack the 
OPEC headquarter in Vienna. Diversification, increasing foreign direct 
investment and the internationalisation of production and supply chains brings 
potential targets closer to the home base of terrorist groups where they enjoy a 
strategic advantage. To aim at safe havens or to keep strategic options would be a 
remedy. To relocate production and areas of operation to regions with a low 
general level of terrorist hazard is one way to keep the risk at bay, yet implies that 
factor cost and competitive advantages can no longer be exploited. Another way 
is to switch production into other, safer lines of business causing underinvestment 
in high risk but otherwise profitable sectors. Pharmaceutical research in gene 
technology is an illustrative case. 
 
3. The choice of organisational form generates vulnerability. Lean governance 
structures ask for a design of value chains or networks operated by specialists in 
control of specific processes where for efficiency reasons a lean configuration 
reduces organisational and HR-overlap. In such an organisational design the 
interruption of production of even small suppliers can cause a life threatening 
breakdown in lean manufacturing as recent studies have shown (Nishiguchi and 
Beaudet, 1998) This study also points to the remedy in form of organisational 
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slack. To duplicate production processes, departments, or knowledge is a way to 
keep potential damage at bay, yet implies to forego scope and scale economies. 
 
All three trade-offs: exposure vs. obscurity, geographical spread vs. strategic options 
(safe havens), and supply chains vs. organisational slack define the willingness of firms 
to tolerate terrorist attacks. Thus, we expect sectoral differences. While for example 
consumer or luxury goods need worldwide exposure, investment goods or business-to 
business relationship can afford to be less “tolerant” when it comes to terrorism. While 
the shape of the toleration function is defined by the firm’s willingness to remain in one 
place or line of business despite terrorist hazard the effect of globalisation, i.e. expected 
shift in the toleration function is less clear. In general it can be assumed that firms will 
tolerate terrorist hazard the smaller the damage caused by each attack (see Figure 1).  
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 Figure 1  The Interaction between terrorism and internationally operating firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 O 
D1 
F1 
B 
A 
 
Net damage, 
Attention 
value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Terrorism Toleration 
function 
Frequency of 
attacks Remarks  
 
The horizontal describes the frequency of attacks. 
The vertical describes the net damage adjusted for attention.  
OA: describes the net return that would not prompt terrorists into action. Only expected returns higher than A will attract  
terrorists. 
E: describes the number of attacks and the average net industrial damage a state (a country) will adjust to at a given supply 
and toleration of terrorist attacks. E13
3. The Influence of globalisation on strategic decisions of firms and 
terrorist groups  
 
Cost and competition rationale, changing markets, or national/international regulation are 
only some of the multiple factors that determine the need and potential for firms to 
compete on a worldwide basis. The strategic management literature on globalisation 
while supporting our emphasis on ubiquity points to more complex patterns of 
organizational strategies. The single most crucial recurring topic in the literature is 
internationalisation of firms, i.e. increase of geographic spread and organizational 
strategy of multinational corporations (Yip, 2003; Doz, Santos and Williamson, 2002; 
Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
2000; Hamel and Prahalad, 1985). The latter is often understood as network type 
configuration of organizational units where the integration of local affiliates’ activities 
follows overarching strategic purposes. Prahalad and Hamel (1990), Collins and Porras 
(1994), Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000) for instance emphasize the extent to which 
multinational corporations integrate multiple foreign direct investments across countries. 
In a similar vein, Yip (2003) describes the process as three steps; strategies that first 
develop core business second internationalise and third globally integrate across countries. 
Gupta and Govindarajan (2000; 1991) emphasize the multiple dimensions of 
globalisation, such as market presence, supply chain, capital base and mindset, and the 
ability to integrate across diversity (Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001).  
In the process of globalisation two effects can be separated: structural effects which firms 
need to accept as given and strategic effects which allow firms searching for means that 
mitigate terrorist hazard. 
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Figure 2  Influence of globalisation on the interaction between attacks and tolerance  
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3.1. Structural effect I: Globalisation increases vulnerability of international firms
 
International firms are among the largest corporations worldwide, often enough seen a
the flagships of industries and advanced technologies (Rugman and Girod, 2003), if th
are not regarded as symbols for western domination of the world economy. These 
qualities alone make international firms attractive targets. Their network-type 
organization and integrative strategies add to the vulnerability as does the accompany
broadening of geographic spread. 
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The horizontal describes the frequency of attacks. 
The vertical describes the net damage adjusted for attention. 
E1: the old equilibrium before globalisation 
D1-D2: describes the increase of net damage due to the structural effect  
E2: the new equilibrium characterized by higher damage at lower frequency IF firms would not respond to terrorist  
hazard 
D2-D3: describes the mitigating effect if firms implement deterrence strategies 
E3: new equilibrium characterized by less damage and less frequency (compared to E2)D3. 
s 
ey 
ing 
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If in addition these integrated networks aim at higher cost efficiency by minimizing slack, 
the effect on vulnerability is even more pronounced.  
 
In short, it is the systematic response of international firms to the chances globalisation 
offers which causes the supply function as developed in Figure 1, to shift to the left (from 
I to II in Figure 2) as the net return of terrorism increases per attack. Subsequently there 
is a positive incentive for increasing terrorist activities, which becomes even more 
pronounced when the effect of globalisation on the organization of terrorism is accounted 
for. 
 
3.2. Structural effect II: Globalisation increases the opaqueness of terrorist activities 
 
The IT-revolution and trade liberalisation did also lead to a re-organisation of and the 
forming of new alliances between different terrorist groups. It is in particular one specific 
feature that is crucial here, namely that with IT information costs are low, if not close to 
nil while the costs for identifying the source of information increased considerably. Thus, 
to trace back information, money, or “commands” to one location, let alone one person 
remains a complicated endeavour, as the case of Bin Laden or Saddam Hussein shows. 
The risk to be arrested and punished does not seem to have increased in the last fifty 
years, if not longer. On the other hand, IT offers an effective and inexpensive way to 
co-ordinate terrorist activities across borders. Moreover, IT offers also an instrument for 
learning about the functioning of firms, governments, markets and their weak points or 
symbols. For example, it is not self-evident that somebody abhorring Western capitalism 
will anticipate the symbolic value of the WTC, i.e. meaning Wall Street, while sitting in 
the hills of Afghanistan. Another example is the shrewdness by which venerable Islamic 
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charity organizations were hijacked to move large sums of money around the globe 
(Schneider, 2002). In other words, while the detection risk and sanctioning have 
remained stable in the last twenty years, the effectivity of terrorist attacks increased 
considerably due to easier knowledge generation and new technologies for the logistics 
around terrorist attacks. The logistic success, referring to the percentage of missions 
completed as planned is as follows: bombings, 87 per cent; hostage missions, 76 per cent; 
assassinations, 75 per cent (Sanders, Enders and Lapan, 1991). 
 
Global terrorism starting in the mid-eighties (see Table 1) is characterised by new forms 
of network organization defined by low exposure of individual terrorist groups, high 
mobility of resources and productive slack (in terms of financial resources and 
prepared-to-die members). The result is what was called the Al-Qaeda model “(…) 
facilitating, funding, or encouraging terrorist actions by pre-existing affiliated indigenous 
groups within the target country” (Smith, 2002: 47) The resulting opaqueness makes it 
difficult for both law enforcement agencies and multinationals to acknowledge events 
that signal changes in terrorist hazard, let alone that they were put on the list of future 
targets (weak signalling). In other words, terrorists can leverage their low exposure, high 
mobility of personnel (temporal spread), and slack (financial and human resources) to 
stage surprise attacks without much risk to be found out.    
This effect works in the same direction as the globalisation effect on firms described 
before. It shifts the supply function to the left (from I to II, Figure 2), implying higher net 
damage and attention per terrorist attack.  
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Corporations can hardly control the structural effects. Only by rethinking their own 
strategies to counter terrorism corporations can change the location and slope of the 
toleration function. Two strategies can be singled out:  
 
Table 2  Stages of globalisation and effectiveness of attacks  
 
 Willingness to tolerate terrorist hazard 
 
Stages of globalisation 
 
 
 
 
Exposure Leanness Geographic spread 
(FDI) 
Expected effectiveness 
of terrorist attack 
(damage) 
 
Local strategy 
 
low 
 
high 
 
low 
 
 
Low-medium 
 
International strategy 
 
 
high 
 
low 
 
high 
 
Medium-high 
 
Integrated strategy 
 
 
high 
 
high 
 
high 
 
High 
 
 
3.3. Strategic effect I: Globalisation strategy defines the scope and scale of 
vulnerable assets 
 
While the analysis above concentrated on a comparative-static view in which firms 
cannot but adapt to changes on the supply side of terrorist activities or structural change 
caused by globalisation, in a dynamic view firms can influence both the pay-off matrix 
for terrorists and the probability to see their own assets attacked. It needs to be 
acknowledged that the decision to become an international firm implies a decision to 
broaden the scale and scope of assets vulnerable for terrorist attacks. 
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A local firm with highly distinctive strategies offers only low returns for terrorist attacks 
even if such a firm is highly exposed in domestic markets by its strategic identity, i.e. 
unique local strategy. In such a case, where the firm serves local customers only, any 
terrorist threat must necessarily remain limited to a local threat. It is worth mentioning 
that a strategy to remain small and local does not reduce the risk to nil. As the examples 
in Northern Ireland, Israel, or Indonesia remind us, many terrorists are motivated by local 
problems, for which they seek local solutions, even if the money and logistics is provided 
by a worldwide operation. In other words, low international exposure or geographic 
spread suggests a low threat of international terrorism, but still one that can be 
devastating for the individual firm that has subscribed to a policy of lean production (see 
below). 
 
Internationalisation increases the exposure of a firm and the scale of assets vulnerable to 
attacks to the extent that it prompts replicating existing best practices by transferring 
them from the home base to other countries. This process creates country specific 
implementations of a home base template (Winter and Szulanski, 2001) with the effect of 
redundancy and unexploited scale economies both of which will be tolerated as long as 
the market presence in multiple countries compensates for operational slack. The lure of 
additional business chances, in other words, leads to both high exposure (market 
presence) and a broad geographical spread in multiple countries. The effect is one of 
“bringing valuable targets” close to the home base of terrorist groups. 
 
Multinationals on the other hand are defined by a worldwide and integrated strategy that 
aims at eliminating inefficiencies within the corporate transaction system, and exploiting 
scale economies across geographical location. The vulnerability of multinationals goes 
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beyond that of an international firm. The integrated strategy of lean production forestalls 
a flexible and quick response to the destruction of one operating unit, as this requires free 
capacity somewhere else. The effect is an organizational form that is exposed to the 
highest risk due to high exposure, leanness in production, and geographical spread (Table 
2).  
 
All in all, while the three levels of globalisation of the firm (local, international, 
integrated multinational) are linked to the strategic goal, they simultaneously also define 
the value of assets vulnerable to terrorist hazard. Exposure, organisational form and 
geographical spread offer further strategic variables by which a firm can mitigate risk.  
 
Table 3  Stages of globalisation and deterrence strategies (obscurity, slack and options) 
 Deterrence strategies 
Stages of globalisation  
 
 
Obscurity Slack Options 
 
Local strategy 
Reducing local 
visibility 
Free capacity Local spread; 
temporary commitment 
 
International strategy 
 
International 
replaces local 
visibility 
Decentralisation 
(international 
duplication) 
International spread; 
temporary commitment 
 
Integrated strategy 
 
Low local 
visibility and 
diffuse global 
visibility 
Decentralisation 
(integrated duplication) 
Global spread; 
portfolio-type 
temporary commitment 
 
 
3.4. Strategic effect II:  Globalisation strategy increases options for deterrence 
 
As shown before obscurity, slack resources, decentralisation and duplication of 
operational units are effective means to cope with terrorist hazard. The geographic spread 
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of multinationals limits the significance of affiliates in a hostile environment, thus 
offering low returns in form of “spectacularity” of attacks. Similarly, sharing of highly 
routinised business processes and decision making such as team building, prioritising, 
and timing routines (Zollo and Winter, 2002; Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001; Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982) help to integrate resources and processes across countries. In case local 
resources would be destroyed quick adjustment and replacement is ensured by the overall 
routine architecture. 
 
The question remains to which extend approaches from the management literature can be 
usefully applied for gaining further insights into the trade-offs between exposure vs. 
obscurity, leanness vs. risk-mitigating slack, and options on permanent geographic spread 
vs. temporary commitments in safe havens. 
 
The positioning view of strategy (Porter, 1980) emphasizing the uniqueness or value of a 
positioning and a tightly integrated system of activities (value chain), cannot contribute 
much beyond pointing to deterrence as measured by foregoing positioning gains. 
Requiring exposure, a tight fit between activities, and long-term commitments makes it 
difficult to deter terrorism as long as exposure aims at a general audience, and lack of 
overlap of activities forestalls any quick reconfiguration of the value chain. The 
resource-based view of the firm (Grant, 1996; Peteraf, 1993; Amit and Schoemaker, 
1993; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) looks more promising in 
particular since research on knowledge and human capital has shown that communities 
and social capital are the key source for the knowledge assets in firms (Wenger and 
Snyder, 2000; Brown and Duguid, 1991). Social networks as platforms for the most 
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valuable, intangible resources suggest slack and options, while exposure remains limited 
to a dispersed group of professional insiders. Moreover, such an analysis suggests that the 
building up of social capital in form of a network of experts, such as risk-management 
specialists in terrorist hazard (as opposed to, for example, financial risk) adds value in 
form of a knowledge base which allows better protecting all other material and 
knowledge assets (Teece, 1998). In contrast to the positioning view risk-management is 
not seen as a cost-factor limiting an otherwise superior strategy but as valuable 
investment in the knowledge base. This view is supported by the dynamic capabilities 
perspective, i.e. the “integrative approach to understanding the newer sources of 
competitive advantage” when it is argued that dynamic capabilities are “a firm’s ability to 
integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly 
changing environments” (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997, 510; 516; Zollo and Winter, 
2002; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2001; Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000; Nonaka, 1994; 
Leonard-Barton, 1992). It is the following claim that draws attention in the context of 
terrorism: Globalisation has largely increased the need to develop simple routines in 
order to appropriate the gains from a temporary advantage by developing organisational 
and resource configurations via “…the organizational and strategic processes by which 
managers manipulate resources into new productive assets in the context of changing 
markets.” (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001: 1229). Dynamic capabilities are to be 
understood as “simple, experiential, unstable processes that rely on quickly created new 
knowledge and interactive execution” or best practices (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000: 
1106). The capability to acquire competence for quickly adjusting to changing 
circumstances when competition and new business chances threaten the value of 
incumbent assets can also usefully employed when the value of assets is threatened by 
terrorist hazard. Dynamic capabilities understood as “the coupling of people and 
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technology are a source of option value” to firms require temporal commitments; they 
enhance a firm’s ability “to exploit current assets and explore future opportunities” 
(Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2001: 756). Dynamic capabilities, therefore offer a promising 
conceptual starting point for integrating terrorist hazard into the overall strategy of firms. 
Firms can achieve this without resorting to exposure or leanness in order to enhance 
competitiveness, the options to quickly adapt and reconfigure resources is highly 
effective in deterring terrorism. 
 
4. Conclusion and recommendations 
 
The analysis above offered a simple model in which terrorism was explained by three 
factors: 1) Exposure causes risk, 2) permanent geographic commitment causes risk, 3) 
lean production causes risk. Based on this framework we looked at how the development 
of domestic corporations towards a globally operating multinational enterprise changes 
the “interaction” with terrorists. Our analysis shows, that globalisation has (structurally) 
shifted the supply function of terrorist attacks so that the net damage per attack has 
increased as has the attention spectacular attacks can attain, both suggesting rising 
terrorism in the future. This trend constitutes the hidden cost of globalisation.  
 
At the moment most corporations seem to accept these costs while trusting national 
governments and law enforcement agencies to cope with terrorism. In contrast to this 
political view, we provide an explanation that focuses on the interaction between firms 
and terrorism, pointing to strategic variables by which firms define the scope and scale of 
 23
vulnerable targets, as well as possible strategies how to better mitigate the risks involved. 
The interactive game can be summarised as follows: 
 
Table 4    The interactive game between firms’ and terrorists’ strategies 
 
 
 Strategic decisions firms 
Strategic decision 
in terrorism 
 
 
 
Exposure 
(geographic spread 
and media) 
Organisational 
forms 
(lean & slack) 
Options and 
commitments 
(dynamic capabilities) 
Disruption of 
business operation 
 
High (low) 
exposure/ 
High (low) 
disruption 
Leanness (slack)/ 
High (low) 
disruption 
(No) options / 
(High) disruption 
Symbolic damage 
leading to high 
attention 
 
High (low) 
exposure/ 
High (low) damage 
Leanness (slack)/ 
High (low) 
damage 
(No) options/ 
(High) damage 
Disruption of an 
economy 
 
High (low) 
exposure/ 
High (low) 
disruption 
Leanness (slack)/ 
High (low) 
disruption 
(No) options/ 
(High) disruption 
 
 
While globalisation defines the value of assets that can be employed at a risk only, 
exposure, leanness and options define the trade-offs at each level of internationalisation. 
Less exposure, more slack or temporal commitments are one way to cope with terrorist 
hazard, yet carrying a price. Decentralisation, duplication of operational units, simple 
routines which can be shared easily, and portfolio investment that reflects terrorist rather 
than financial risk seem to be strategies that run counter the bulk of the existing 
management literature.  
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1 In search for literature on terrorism, we used the Proquest database for all years (1970-2003). We found 455 
articles in peer review journals on terrorism (keyword in title). We then selected the 15 most influential peer 
reviewed, academic journals and found 31 articles that mention terrorism in the body. Eleven articles have the 
keyword in the abstracts; many react to the attacks on September 11, 2001. Only 3 articles have the keyword in the 
title. Besides one review about a case and essay collection unspecific to terrorism, two articles actually addressed 
issues similar to those mentioned here. Ryans and Shanklin (1980) do however expand on the relationship between 
globalisation and terrorism. Harvey (1992) presents the first empirical data on corporate antiterrorist programs of 
US multinational corporations. He finds that only 42 % of the 178 Fortune 500 multinationals participating in a 
survey had formal programs addressing the threat of terrorism. 
2 Frey and Luechinger (2003) provide an extended overview of the economic literature on terrorism. 
3 Thus for example only in 2001 there were 178 bombings against multinational oil pipelines in Colombia alone 
(Nitsch and Schumacher, 2002). 
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